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Abstract—With the rapid growth of mobile internet, mobile
application, like website navigation, searching, e-Shopping and
app download, etc. are all popular in worldwide. Meanwhile, it
become more and more popular that traditional HTTP protocol,
which is also applying in not only web browsing but also
communication between mobile application clients and servers.
Besides, it has made HTTP Hijacking profitable. Furthermore,
it has brought a lot of troubles for users, network operators and
ISP. We analyze the principle of HTTP spectral Hijacking and
present a mechanism of collaboratively detecting and locating
called Co HijackingMonitor. Experimental result shows that,
Co HijackingMonitor can solve the hijacking problem effectively.
Index Terms—hijacking; web security; MITM; http redirect;
DPI;
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, website navigation, search, e-commerce,
mobile application download are widely adopted and HTTP
protocol is becoming more and more popular. HTTP protocol
is not only used in web browsing, but also a large number
of communications between mobile application clients and
servers use HTTP.
This has brought huge underground market space using
HTTP hijacking technology. Besides, it also brought great
trouble to users, network operators and internet service
providers. Hijacker can hide on the way of all routing nodes.
The means of hijacking are endless and continue to retrofit,
such as homepage modifying, process hooking, system boot
hijacking, LSP injection, browser plug-in hijacking [1], HTTP
proxy filter [2], kernel data packet hijacking [3], bootkit [4],
CDN cache pollution [5].
Because network operators own the network link, they have
inherent advantages for HTTP hijacking. The usual way is
spectral hijacking bypassing communication link. From the
point of view of end-to-end, HTTP hijacking could occur in the
side of internet terminal, network link and cloud. This article
specifically aimed at the research of HTTP hijacking and
detecting technology on the network link( or called spectral
hijacking). HTTP hijacking, in short, is an attack to monitor
HTTP message in a dedicated data channel established by the
user and the web server. Once meeting the default conditions,
the hijacker will insert the well-designed network data packets
into the normal data stream. The purpose is to allow the client
program to interpret the error’ data and pop up a new window
in the web browser to display the contents of promotional ads
or directly display a web site in order to make a large profit.
Several typical methods of HTTP hijacking [6]: (1)Hijackers
add or tamper the channel code of Ad network or website
promotion. They mainly aimed at website navigation, web
search engine and some major e-commerce website. The
hijackers use HTTP hijacking technology to modify or add
promotional channel code brutally in order to grab the profit
of target website promotion. Such hijacking applications have
been extended to web navigation and searching, software and
mobile application (APK/EXE) downloading, game distribu-
tion, and so on. (2)Hijackers add extra advertisements on
normal sites, like pop-up windows.
HTTP hijacking has caused varying degrees of harm to
both users and service providers. For users, it is not only
easy to leak the user’s sensitive information, but also hijack
a large number of internet user’s behavior. Finally,it is very
easy to cause the risk of online financial transactions. For
service providers, a large number of promotional costs were
grabed. At the same time, HTTP hijacking can also make
user’s web browsering fail or redirect. Therefore, the detection
and prevention of HTTP hijacking are of great significance.
The first section of this paper introduces the related work.
In the second section, the principle of HTTP hijacking on the
network link is analyzed in detail. The third section describes
the design scheme of the Co Hijacking Monitor mechanism
in detail; including TTL detection based on dynamic updating
method of target website routing hash table, HTTP response
behavior, cooperative monitoring and traceability. In the fourth
section, the experiment is carried out in a real network. We
evaluate the ability of Co Hijacking to detect and locate the
HTTP spectral hijacking attack.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, both the industry and academic pay much
attention to the problem of HTTP hijacking on the operator’s
network links.However, it is still very difficult for network
operators to detect HTTP spectral hijacking in time. The
existing detection schemes are either not practical enough or
lack of efficiency. Details are below.
In this paper, we think that we should start from the prin-
ciple of hijacking if we plan to find a practical and effective
method of detecting HTTP spectral Hijacking. We should find
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out the rule of the HTTP spectral hijacking and then build the
model of spectral hijacking originally. In addition, there are
a large number of links in the communication network.That
is to say, hijacker can attack from a lot of nodes of network,
so it is necessary to use cooperative method of monitoring in
order to cover all the possible attack points. From the point
of view of the target website, the related work in the field
of spectral hijacking can be classified into two categories:
One is DNS hijacking, the other is HTTP hijacking. The
DNS hijacking occurs frequently on the network link, because
DNS server is more concentrated, attackers is easy to deploy
attacking devices. So this kind of attacks have frequently
emerged since 2003, until 2015 when Baidu sued China
Chongqing Telecom DNS hijacking, which made it reach
the peak [7]. The detection and location of DNS hijacking
can be divided into three types: Passive monitoring detection,
false packet detection and cross check query. The method of
passive monitoring is mainly to capture all DNS requests and
responses pairs, and then detect hijacking attacks by behaviors
analysis [8]. False message detection using the initiative to
send a probe to detect whether there is a DNS hijacking [6, 8].
Cross check query is mainly to further reverse the query of
the results of DNS analysis, and to detect hijacking attacks
by determining whether the two result of query are consistent.
Each of these methods has its advantages and disadvantages,
in which the passive monitoring detection is a passive way,
the other two are active. Passive monitoring detection will not
cause the network’s additional traffic, but the method cannot
apply to the new attack or variant means with the change
of DNS hijacking behavior. False packet detection requires
a large number of active packets to send, it will increase
extra burden over the network. Cross detection query greatly
depends on the capabilities of DNS server with reverse query
service , but a lot of DNS does not have the ability. Because
HTTP spectral hijacking is a kind of new attack in recent
years, the related research work is less accumulated. Network
operators mostly use the source address detection method to
detect whether there are packets with fake addresses in the
network [9, 10]. But because there are a lot of other network
attacks, such as DDoS, which also uses a fake address, so this
method cannot be applied to identify and detect the HTTP
hijacking accurately.
Some researchers use flow identification methods to detect
such attacks [11–13]. However, this kind of method is often
unable to achieve accurate identification. So it is a lack of
operability in real network.
III. HTTP HIJACKING PRINCIPLE ANALYSIS
A. Spectral hijacking deployment structure
As shown in Fig. 1, under usual circumstances, the attacker
sniffs all the spectral traffic information by deploying the
related traffic acquisition device at the core router. There are
other circumstances where operators deploy DPI/CDN/ cache
and other systems in bypass which hijack attackers use to
launch attacks. The acquisition device can be configured by
policy, only collect part of traffic such as DNS, HTTP uplink
Fig. 1. spectral hijacking topology on network link
GET requests, etc. When a normal HTTP session request
is routed through the device, the acquisition device uses
the HTTP hijacking technique to hijack the HTTP session,
and implement the next attack, such as sending camouflage
response packet to the hijacked client in order to force the
client to jump to a false site, etc.
B. HTTP hijacking principle
After the web server that is accessed by a user’s browser
and sends an HTTP request, routers of the operator will
first receive the HTTP request, the bypass device of the
operator routers also received a copy of the HTTP request
after spectral or mirroring. Then send camouflage response
packet for hijacking before the web server returning the data.
The browser will jump to the target web site after receiving
the camouflage response, the real data of the web server will
be discarded after the true data of the web server.
Fig. 2. HTTP response 302 redirect hijacking schematic
According to the different disguised response package, can
be divided into 302 redirect hijacking and 200 OK hijacking
method. As shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. HTTP 302 redirect
hijacking, as its name implies, that is, in the way of HTTP
302 redirect response to disguise the return of the response
packet, and fill in the hijacking target site URL in the jumping
URL in the internal packet, in order to achieve the purpose
of forcing users to visit the target site B browser. HTTP 200
OK hijacking is to use HTTP 200 OK response to camouflage
response packet, and inject a script in the JS script, in order
to achieve forced users to display the browser hijacking side
Fig. 3. HTTP response 200 OK hijacking schematic
display content, such as pop, floating window, Banner , other
advertising content.
C. The law of HTTP hijacking
Fig. 4. The trend of the number of route hops in normal session
Fig. 5. The trend of the number of routes in the hijacking session
From the above principle, we can see that the HTTP
hijacking has the following characteristics:
1) TTL value: The TTL value of the camouflage response
packet is often less than the normal value, mainly due to the
hijacking device in the network link is located between the
target site and users, so the TTL value is less than normal,
and the TTL value is the same packet camouflage, because
spectral hijack points are fixed, the camouflage response to
the user’s routing number is basically the same. As shown in
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.
2) HTTP 302 redirect response: The proportion of HTTP
302 redirect packets in the network is higher than the normal
value.
3) sequence number: When the hijacking occurs, the hi-
jacked session often has a request that corresponds to one of
the previous two different response packets, and the sequence
number of the two response packets is the same.
IV. MECHANISM DESIGN
A. Detection mechanism description
We designed a new method for real time detection of spec-
tral hijacking-Co Hijacking Monitor based on the principle of
the HTTP and the description of the law in the second quarter.
First, the mechanism is modeled from the TTL value, or the
number of routing hops, and the subsequent behavior of the
normal response of the HTTP, study the rule of HTTP, mine
out the difference between the HTTP spectral hijacking and
the normal conversation behavior, and detect the TTL value
for each HTTP session through the establishment of a set of
large-scale dynamic updates of the target site routing hash
table.
Meanwhile, for the part of the attackers, may use the TTL
value to avoid tampering detection, use HTTP subsequent nor-
mal response behavior to determine whether it is a hijacking
behavior. Third, select operator network access layer BRAS
level to carry out traffic spectral detection in order to cover
as much as possible the detection range of the attack. Then
set up a whole set of the whole network spectral monitoring
system, detect HTTP spectral hijacking behaviors efficiently
and quickly, it also puts forward the means of tracing the
point of attack.
The Co Hijacking Monitor mechanism proposed in this
paper has the following 4 characteristics:
1) impact on the network: Access layer on the operator’s
network, in addition to collecting the HTTP uplink and
downlink handshake information, does not need to make any
changes to the existing network infrastructure, that facilitates
the practical application and incremental deployment.
2) TTL tampering: Judge comprehensively whether the
existence of hijacking by TTL detection combined with HTTP
follow-up response behavior. Make up the drawbacks that
the simple TTL detection cannot identify correctly the HTTP
hijacking behavior under the condition of TTL tampering. Let
the False Positive Ratio reduced to lowest.
3) collaborative detection: Using the theory of collabora-
tive detection can accurately locate the point of the spectral
hijacking , so then, the significant and difficult problem in
spectral hijacking and in detecting and locating has been
solved. And the traceability success rate increased to 90
4) share the cost: Each participant is only responsible
for monitoring their own BRAS domain. In this way, the
monitoring cost of the whole system is shared, so there is no
high cost and scalability problems faced by detection locating
system. However, the work of this paper can not replace the
operators full network hijacking detection locating scheme. We
did not take HTTPS and hijacking attack point located below
the BRAS device into account the hijacking.
V. HIJACK DETECTION DEPLOYMENT TOPOLOGY
Fig. 6. HTTP spectral hijacking detection system deployment
Several conditions are needed to meet the deployment of
the spectral detection system. First, the hijacking detection
point must be close enough to the user side. The purpose is
to capture the interference of the camouflage response packet
flow. Second, the deployment costs should be low enough.
If the deployment cost is too large, it does not have the
implementation of feasibility.
In this paper, the detection system is divided into two parts,
mainly including the traffic collecting device and locating
subsystem, as shown in Fig. 6.
1) traffic collection: Traffic collecting point is deployed in
the operator’s access nodes adjacent to the BRAS device. This
is mainly to take into account the BRAS device access to
almost all of the Internet terminal, at the same time the device
is located in the access authentication level, close enough to
the user, the spectral hijacking attacks are usually in the upper
layer of the BRAS, which can ensure that the traffic acquisition
equipment can fully capture the packet flow of the interference.
2) flow mirror method: From the perspective of acquisition
and construction costs, flow collection methods using the flow
mirror method, in order to avoid a large number of investments
and construction of spectral equipment. BRAS devices often
have the ability to mirror the flow, in particular, can be directly
configured to mirror the flow of a certain type of port, such
as HTTP up and down flow required for this paper.
3) flow filtering: Traffic collection equipment mainly work
for simple flow filtering. In this paper, we mainly need to filter
out the HTTP response packet, such as 301, 302, 200, etc.
4) detecting and locating subsystem: The subsystem
mainly perfom the detecting and tracking of HTTP, including
the detecting server and storage node and ethernet switch.
The detection and tracking algorithms will be described in
detail below.
A. Hijacking detection algorithm
Here we define the related notation and terms.
1) BN: the detection area set, which is the detection area
of the BRAS device. BN is a set of BRAS devices, that is
BN = {β1, β2, β3...βn}
β refers to the BRAS devices. βBN, 1 ≤ n ≤ N , such as β1
refers to BRAS1, βn refers to BRASn.
2) SN: the set of hijacked target sites, that is
SN = {θ1, θ2, θ3...θk}
θ refers to the host name of the target site that was hijacked,
such as news.sina.com.cn. θSN, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, k is an integer,
and K is the number of target sites to be detected.
3) IN: the IP set of the target site server that was hijacked,
that is
IN = {γ1, γ2, γ3...γj}
γIN, 1 ≤ j ≤ M , j is an integer, M is the number of the
target site server IP. Considering that the target site with the
same host name may have a different number of server IP
addresses.
4) HN: the normal route hop count of the target site, that
is
HN = {h1, h2, h3...hj}
1 ≤ j ≤ M , h refers to the normal route hops of the target
site. j is an integer, M is the number of the target hijacked
server IP.
5) UN: the actual routing hops of the target site, that is
UN = {µ1, µ2, µ3...µi}
µUN, 1 ≤ i ≤ I , u refers to the actual route number of the
target site. i is an integer and I is the number of HTTP session
response packets.
First, the mechanism is modeled from the TTL value, or
the number of routing hops, and the subsequent behavior of
the normal response of the HTTP. Study its principle, dig out
the differences of HTTP spectral hijacking and normal HTTP
session behavior. Meanwhile, we established a hash table of
large-scale dynamic updating routing for a set of target sites to
detect TTL value of each HTTP session. At the same time, for
the part of the attacker may use tamper TTL values to avoid
detection, use HTTP follow-up response behavior to further
determine whether it is hijacked. As shown in Fig. 7. Third,
in order to cover as much as possible the scope of attack
detection, select operator network access layer BRAS level to
carry out traffic spectral detection, to set up a whole set of
the whole network spectral monitoring system, detect HTTP
spectral hijacking efficiently and quickly.
The detection algorithm is as follows:
(1) Build the hash table of a normal number of routes in the
Top N site based on TTL value. Considering the huge number
of the target site, the number of routing tables will be very
Fig. 7. Co HijackingMonitor detection mechanism algorithm
great. however, it is easy to search and find to store those
tables by hash table. The target site server IP address can be
the index of hash table, as shown in Table 1.
TABLE I
THE TARGET SITE ROUTING HOPS TABLE
No SN IN BN HN
1 θ1 γ1 β1 h1
2 θ2 γ2 β2 h2
3 θ3 γ3 β3 h3
... ... ... ... ...
n θn γj βn hj
(2) Traffic collection, filtering, extraction of session pa-
rameters. Co HijackingMonitor is mainly aimed at the HTTP
response, especially the HTTP 302 redirect response and the
200 OK response to the session parameters extraction, the
extracted information mainly includes the target server IP
address, TTL value and so on.
(3) comparing route hop count. It is mainly to compare the
extracted session parameters with the target site routing hops
hash table. If the number of is less than the normal, the session
will be marked as suspicious.
(4) Determine whether there is the same serial number of
the response packet in this session or not. If there is, it is
determined that the session has been hijacked, otherwise, the
suspicious mark of the session is cleared.
(5) record all spectral hijacking information, as shown in
Table 2. The list contains the target site server IP address,
attack area, IP address of victim and other information.
TABLE II
HIJACKING DETAIL RECORD LIST TABLE
No SN IN BN IP Address of Victim
1 θ1 γ1 β1 IP1
2 θ2 γ2 β2 IP2
3 θ3 γ3 β3 IP3
... ... ... ... ...
n θn γj βn IPj
B. Detecting and locating algorithm
It is also very important to locate or trace the hijacking
attack event. We should locate the attack point at which level
of the network, such as access, convergence, core network and
so on. The attack target is often not targeted by the attackers,
Fig. 8. Co HijackingMonitor attack detecting and locating algorithm
that is, the spectral hijacking attacker will not be specific to
the broadband Internet users. Therefore, the attack behavior
will be irregularly scattered in different BRAS area BN, which
makes the location of the source of the attack is very difficult.
But the base of the attacker’s attack is the bypass spectral, so
the attack point is often collected in all the HTTP traffic of a
certain level network. As shown in Fig. 8.
The spectral hijacking tracing algorithm is as follows:
(1) create a routing topology table based on network level, as
shown in Table 3.
(2) Find out the statistics of attack area BNs distribution
principle. That is
BN = {β1, β2, β3...βn}
(3) Step up the network level one by one, estimate the
convergence point of upper network level in the area of BN .
(4) Repeat step (2), until convergence points to a single routing
device or a routing autonomous domain. So the hijacking
attack occurred in the router.
TABLE III
ROUTING TOPOLOGY OF NETWORK LEVEL
No IP Address
of Victim
BN Border
Router
Core Router IN
1 IP1 β1 BR1 CR1 γ1
2 IP2 β2 BR2 CR2 γ2
3 IP3 β3 BR3 CR3 γ3
... ... ... ... ... ...
n IPn βn BRn CRn γn
As what can be seen from Figure. 9, the distribution of
points of spectral hijacking attacks in some specific BRAS de-
vices. At the same time, according to table 3, we can follow it
to find these specific BRAS access devices are concentrated on
one BR. And at the same time, by comparing the distribution
of the HTTP 302 redirection response on different BRAS, as
shown in Figure. 10, it is also very obvious that these attacks
occur on the specific BRAS devices received on the HTTP
302 redirection response accounted for an unusually high. It
further proves and confirms the occurrence of these attacks
and the access point of the hijacking attack.
VI. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
Usually, people evaluate the detection capability of the
system by two key indicators, which are mistake rate and
Fig. 9. the distribution of the BRAS area of the hijacking attack
Fig. 10. Response distribution of HTTP 302 in different BRAS areas
miss rate. The basic indicators are defined:True Positive (TP),
represents the number of samples that are correctly detected
as hijacking attacks, and the False Positive (FP), represents the
number of samples that are mistakenly detected as hijacking
attacks. True Negative (TN), represents the number of samples
correctly detected for normal sessions. False Negative (FN),
represents the number of samples mistakenly detected for
normal sessions. From this, we can define a number of
commonly used indicators.
A. Detection Rate
that is the True Positive Rate, sometimes referred to as
the Recall Rate, represents the proportion of samples that are
correctly detected as hijacking attacks in all hijacked samples.
B. False Alarm Rate
that is False Positive Rate, represents the proportion of
samples that are mistakenly detected as hijacking attacks in
all hijacked samples.
C. Missed Detection Rate
that is False Negative Rate, represents the proportion of
samples that are mistakenly detected as normal sessions.
D. Classification accuracy (ACC)
is the ratio of all correctly detected samples to all samples.
That is:
ACC = (TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN)
We set up a real HTTP man in the middle attack envi-
ronment, access spectral related hijacking attacks device in
the BR side of an operator’s metropolitan area network. We
use multi frequency, a short period of hijacking attacks in
order not to affect the user’s normal Internet access, as far as
possible to reduce the user’s perception. We have organized
nearly 30 measurements, each time the attack time is measured
in 5 minutes, from the ROC curve of Figure. 11, we can see
that, in this paper, the accuracy of the Co Hijacking Monitor
detection algorithm is very high, close to 99%.
Fig. 11. ROC curve of the accuracy of the detection of spectral hijacking
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Attack and defense in network have been the driving force
of the entire the network security and network circles. Only
by constantly discovering the weakness of the network, we
can establish and improve the security and robustness of the
network. Aiming at the spectral hijacking which has been a
social realistic problem, we put forward the detection and
localization of spectral hijacking. The benefits of ISP have
played a positive role in improving operator pipeline safety
and protecting users. However, with the popularity of HTTPS,
the difficulty of network hijacking detection will increase, the
detection and prevention of this problem, it will be the focus
of our next step.
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